THE EXTRATERRITORIAL PROVISIONS OF THE DODD-FRANK
ACT PROTECTS U.S. TAXPAYERS FROM WORLDWIDE BAILOUTS
Michael Greenberger ∗
The significant extraterritorial scope of the derivatives regulation within
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 1 promises to
foster rigorous international standards for financial regulation that will restore
transparency and stability to the global derivatives market. At present, that
market exceeds $700 trillion notional value, or over ten times the world GDP. 2
Despite opposition from Wall Street to the present extraterritorial application of
almost all of Dodd-Frank’s derivatives regulation, the plain language of the
statute requires implementing that regulation on an appropriate extraterritorial
basis in order to protect U.S. taxpayers from bailing out financial institutions
engaging in foreign derivatives trading, as was required of those taxpayers after
the subprime credit meltdown of 2008.3
The unregulated nature of the global derivatives market exposes the
world to continued systemic risk, especially in a time of worry about sovereign
defaults and the defaults of banks that hold or a have insured through synthetic
derivatives sovereign debt. 4 Defaults of that nature are conceded by almost
everyone as having the ability to trigger undercapitalized and non-transparent
credit derivatives of the kind that compounded the 2008 subprime fiasco and that
led to the U.S. taxpayers’ near-$13 trillion bailout of the financial industry. 5
With worldwide economic stability at stake, tough, but appropriate,
extraterritorial regulatory protections for the derivatives markets are needed
instantaneously.
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This article shows that the extraterritorial reach of Dodd-Frank
derivatives rules on capitalization, collateralization, and transparency will restore
stability and integrity to the global derivatives market. To this end, the article is
divided into five parts. First, the article demonstrates how Dodd-Frank aims to
regulate derivatives trading so as to avoid, inter alia, the kind of systemic risk
that presented itself in the wake of the subprime mortgage meltdown. Second, it
establishes that Congress, pursuant to its constitutional authority, intended U.S.
financial reforms to apply on extraterritorial basis so long as the United States
has a vested relationship to the derivatives transactions in question. Third, the
article discusses the current controversy caused by worldwide “Too Big to Fail”
banks and the European Union surrounding the extraterritorial scope of DoddFrank-mandated reforms.
Fourth, the article defends the extraterritorial
application of Dodd-Frank regulations when a derivatives trade either involves a
U.S. party or has the potential to substantially threaten the U.S. economy: it
demonstrates that Congress has the constitutional authority to direct the
extraterritorial application of U.S. derivatives regulations and that such an
application aligns with U.S. regulators’ standard enforcement practices. Fifth,
the article shows that the extraterritorial scope of Dodd-Frank regulation is
necessary to protect U.S. taxpayers from the risks posed by the global derivatives
market as it affects U.S. interests and that that scope will benefit U.S. banks and
the U.S. economy by establishing a more stable derivatives market. For that
matter, the extraterritorial application of Dodd-Frank derivatives standards will
protect foreign taxpayers from further bailouts of defaulting and the world
economy from systemically risky banking institutions.
I. THE DODD-FRANK ACT AIMS TO RESTORE TRANSPARENCY
AND STABILITY TO THE DERIVATIVES MARKET
On July 21, 2010, President Barack Obama signed the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) into law. The statute
aims “[t]o promote the financial stability of the United States by improving
accountability and transparency in the financial system.” 6 It also aims “to protect
the American taxpayer by ending bailouts” and to end the “abusive financial
services practices” 7 that led to the 2008 financial crisis.
Dodd-Frank transforms the regulation of what was the over-the-counter
(OTC) derivatives market by subjecting most swaps to clearing and exchange
trading, including capital, margin and reporting requirements. 8 Title VII of that

6

Dodd-Frank Act at Preamble.
Id.
8
BAIRD WEBEL ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40975, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM AND THE
111TH CONGRESS 12 (2010), available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/141604.pdf
(“H.R. 4173 . . . mandate[s] reporting, centralized clearing, and exchange-trading of OTC
derivatives . . . The bill[] require[s] regulators to impose capital requirements on swap dealers and
‘major swap participants.’”).
7
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statute requires all “swap dealers” (SDs) and “major swap participants” (MSPs)
to register with the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and/or
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 9 and to disclose any material risks
associated with swaps as well as any material incentives or conflicts of interest.10
Additionally, SDs and MSPs must meet capital requirements and conform to
business conduct rules that include prohibitions against fraud and market
manipulation. 11 SDs and MSPs must conform to position limits on their
commodity swaps trades and report swaps transactions to U.S. regulators. 12
Additionally, Dodd-Frank imposes clearing and exchange requirements
on standardized swap transactions. 13 A clearing facility stands between the buyer
and seller of a contract to guarantee each against the failure of the other party. 14
To avoid their own liability, clearing facilities have a strong incentive to establish
and enforce the capital adequacy of traders, including the collection of margin,
i.e., deposits on the amount at risk in a trade. 15 Under Dodd-Frank, the
regulatory agencies decide whether specific types of swaps must be cleared and
designated clearing organizations (DCOs) must inform regulators about which
types of swaps they plan to clear.16
Also, DCOs must allow “nondiscriminatory” access to clearing. 17 Swaps that U.S. regulators require to be
cleared must be traded on a designated contract market, securities exchange, or
swap execution facility. 18 Swaps do not have to be cleared or exchange traded if
no existing entity lists a particular swap product.19 Finally, Dodd-Frank imposes
its reporting requirements for swaps, whether or not they are cleared.20

9

Dodd-Frank § 731(a).
Id. §§ 731(h)(3)(B), 764(h)(3)(B)(i)-(iii).
11
Id. §§ 731(e), 764(e)-(h).
12
Id. §§ 737, 763(h), 727(c).
13
See Ownership Limitations and Governance Requirements for Security-Based Swap Clearing
Agencies, Security-Based Swap Execution Facilities, and National Securities Exchanges with
Respect to Security-Based Swaps Under Regulation MC, 75 Fed. Reg. 65882 (proposed Oct. 26,
2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 242) (explaining some of the regulations that the Dodd-Frank
Act imposes on swap transactions).
14
See RENA S. MILLER , CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41715, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN DERIVATIVES
CLEARING 1 (.2011), available at http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=
1832&context=key_workplace (“Clearing is an institutional arrangement that helps protect against
counterparty default. A DCO, or clearinghouse, clears and settles derivatives contracts between
counterparties.”).
15
See COMM. ON PAYMENT & SETTLEMENT SYS., BANK OF INT’L SETTLEMENTS, MARKET
STRUCTURE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CLEARING INDUSTRY: IMPLICATIONS FOR FINANCIAL STABILITY
57 (2010), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss92.pdf (“Central clearing generally reduces
systemic risk and therefore carries social benefits. Principally, it reallocates credit risks to an entity
. . . whose dedicated role it is to manage those risks in a robust and transparent manner.”).
16
Dodd-Frank Act §§ 723(h)(2)(A), 763(a)(1).
17
Id. § 763(a)(2)(B).
18
Id. §§ 723(e), 763(a)(2)(B).
19
Id. § 763.
20
Id. §§ 727, 731, 764.
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II. CONGRESS DIRECTED U.S. REGULATORS TO IMPLEMENT
DODD-FRANK-MANDATED REFORMS ON AN EXTRATERRITORIAL
BASIS IN ORDER TO PROTECT U.S. INTERESTS
Dodd-Frank authorizes U.S. regulators to apply regulations promulgated
under the statute to foreign subsidiaries of U.S. banks, foreign banks and to
trades conducted outside of the United States that directly involve U.S. parties or
substantially impact the U.S. economy. For example, Dodd-Frank regulations
apply to any non-U.S. financial institution that enters into a swaps transaction
with a U.S. counterparty, even if the transaction occurs outside of the United
States.21 Section 722(d) directs the CFTC—which oversees approximately
eighty-five percent of the derivatives market covered by Dodd-Frank 22—to
regulate any activity that has a “direct and significant connection with activities
in, or effect on, commerce of the United States.”23 Section 722(d) also directs
the CFTC to regulate extraterritorial activities that contravene rules or regulations
promulgated by the agency and that “are necessary or appropriate to prevent the
evasion of any provision of this Act.” 24
U.S. regulators have already relied on the extraterritorial scope of the
Dodd-Frank Act to regulate certain swaps activities that directly involve or
directly threaten the interests of U.S. persons and/or the U.S. economy, even if
these activities occur outside of U.S. territory. The CFTC will likely require nonU.S. financial institutions that trade on U.S. markets or with U.S. counterparties
to register as SDs and to adhere to CFTC regulations. 25 Also, the CFTC’s

21

See COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N & SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, PUBLIC ROUNDTABLE TO
DISCUSS INTERNATIONAL ISSUES RELATING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF TITLE VII OF THE DODDFRANK ACT 155 (2011) [hereinafter ROUNDTABLE TO DISCUSS INTERNATIONAL ISSUES], available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-151-transcript.pdf (testimony of Marcelo Riffaud) (“The
minute you touch a U.S. person, as we’ve said repeatedly, you now have U.S. rules that will
attach.”); id. at 152 (testimony of Angie Karna) (“[W]hichever regulated entity directly deals with a
U.S. client will be registered under Dodd-Frank.”); id. at 64 (testimony of David Kelly) (“[I]f
you’re dealing with an American resident counterparty then it’s pretty difficult to get yourself out
of American regulation.”); see also Stephen R. Smerek & Jason C. Hamilton, The Long Arm of the
Law: Morrison, Dodd-Frank, and the Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Regulators, SEC. REG. & L.,
Oct. 4, 2011, at 2, available at http://www.winston.com/siteFiles/Publications/PDFArtic2.pdf
(noting that Dodd-Frank authorizes the SEC to regulate certain securities transactions conducted by
foreign investors outside of the United States, i.e. transactions that have a foreseeable and
substantial effect on the U.S. economy).
22
Correspondence by Chris Young, Dir. of U.S. Pub. Policy, Int’l Swaps & Derivatives Ass’n
(noting that although the CFTC and SEC have yet to finalize the definition of “swap” and
“security-based swap,” the CFTC will likely have jurisdiction over “[w]ell over 80%” of the
derivatives market and probably close to 85% of the market) (on file with author).
23
Dodd-Frank Act § 722(d)(i)(1).
24
Id. § 722(d)(i)(2).
25
CLEARY GOTTLIEB STEEN & HAMILTON LLP, DODD FRANK: ONE YEAR LATER: KEY CURRENT
ISSUES FOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 29 (2011), available at http://www.cgsh.com/files/News/d3b7c
782-5cae-4332-88be-358ac68b2156/Presentation/NewsAttachment/a072cdb4-5bc5-49ff-b34c-35a6
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proposed margin collection requirements under Dodd-Frank apply to U.S. and
foreign counterparties of a covered swap entity. 26 The Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation has proposed rules that would require foreign banks that have a
small U.S. presence to submit “living wills”—outlines of how a company would
be liquidated in the event of a failure—to U.S. regulators. 27 Finally, the proposed
Volcker Rule, which seeks to prevent banks that receive federal assistance from
engaging in proprietary trading or owning more than three percent of hedge funds
and private-equity funds, 28 applies to any bank with even marginal connections
to the United States. 29
III. LARGE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND FOREIGN
GOVERNMENTS HAVE ATTEMPTED TO ALTER THE PLAIN AND
CONSTITUTIONAL EXTRATERRITORIAL REACH OF DODD-FRANK
Despite Congress’s clear intent to apply Dodd-Frank-mandated reforms
on an extraterritorial basis where U.S. interests or the stability of the U.S.
economy are at risk, Too Big to Fail Banks and their allies have opposed any
application of Dodd-Frank outside of the United States. For example, Sally
Miller, Chief Executive of the Institute of International Bankers, has complained
that the proposed version of the Volcker Rule would “reach far beyond the shores
of the US and apply . . . to all of the global activities of every foreign bank that
2d910c56/CGSH%20Alert%20-%20Dodd-Frank%20-%20One%20Year%20Later.pdf; see also
Matt Cameron, US Banks Could Lose Competitive Edge in Europe, Says EIB, RISK MAG., Mar. 9,
2012, http://www.risk.net/risk-magazine/news/2156305/banks-lose-competitive-edge-europe-eib
(“US swaps rules governing central clearing and bilateral collateralisation contain no exemptions
for non-US sovereigns, central banks and multilateral development banks, unlike European
derivatives rules, which exclude those entities from the scope of the regulation.”).
26
CLEARY GOTTLIEB STEEN & HAMILTON LLP, PRUDENTIAL REGULATORS PROPOSE SWAP MARGIN
AND CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS 2 (2011) [hereinafter SWAP MARGIN AND CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS],
available at http://www.cgsh.com/files/News/482d3044-e328-46d2-8f7e-f3c2676e03e4/Presentati
on/NewsAttachment/26f3059e-4a89-4ffa-938f-f501552fb8fb/CGSH%20Alert%20-%20Prudential
%20Regulators%20Propose%20Swap%20Margin%20and%20Capital%20Requirements.pdf (“The
proposed margin collection requirements would generally apply to U.S. and non-U.S. domiciled
counterparties of a covered swap entity.”); see also CLEARY GOTTLIEB STEEN & HAMILTON LLP,
supra note 25, at 38 (“The Federal banking agencies have proposed to apply U.S. margin
requirements to transactions by separately incorporated foreign subsidiaries of U.S. persons . . .
with other foreign persons, even when the subsidiary does not have a guarantee from its U.S.
parent.”).
27
Suzanne Kapner et al., Overseas Banks Pursue ‘Living-Will’ Exemption, WALL ST. J., Sept. 14,
2011, at C1.
28
See Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in, and
Relationships With, Hedge Funds and Covered Funds, 77 Fed. Reg. 8332 (proposed Feb. 14, 2012)
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 75) (describing the proposed rule as “contain[ing] certain
prohibitions and restrictions on the ability of a banking entity and nonbank financial company
supervised by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System . . . to engage in proprietary
trading and have certain interests in, or relationships with, a hedge fund or private equity fund”).
29
Yalman Onaran, Bank Lobby Widened Volcker Rule, Inciting Foreign Outrage, BLOOMBERG
(Feb. 23, 2012, 2:56 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-23/banks-lobbied-to-widenvolcker-rule-before-inciting-foreigners-against-law.html.
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maintains even so much as a small branch in the US.” 30 Miller also complained
that the extraterritorial scope of U.S. financial regulations grossly exceeds the
scope of foreign regulations: “none of the foreign regulators has proposed
applying its local restrictions to the internal activities of US banks operating
within America. One could only imagine the response of US regulators were the
situation reversed.” 31 In this respect, the financial industry has lobbied for a
change to Dodd-Frank that would limit that statutes reach to the sovereign
borders of the U.S. even when U.S. institutions and U.S. interests are at stake.
Similarly, several non-U.S. banks have protested the extraterritorial
reach of Dodd-Frank reforms, even when these reforms seek to protect the
United States’s economic welfare. For example, Norinchukin Bank in Japan has
argued that banning foreign banks with U.S. offices from engaging in proprietary
trading “seems an excessive and extra-territorial application which deviates from
one of the main objectives of the Dodd-Frank Act, namely, containing systemic
risks.” 32 Also, the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Central
Bank (ECB) have threatened not to trade OTC swaps with U.S. banks if they are
subject to Dodd-Frank’s clearing and bilateral collateralization requirements.33
The banks argue that development and central banks pose no risk to the
economy. 34 To the extent that EIB and ECB’s OTC swaps trades do not threaten
U.S. interests, the banks should not have to comply with Dodd-Frank regulation;
however, trading by those banks that involves U.S. persons and/or imposes risk
on U.S. taxpayers and/or threatens the U.S. economy falls within Dodd-Frank’s
regulatory purview.
Further, Wall Street and the City of London have mobilized international
governments and governing bodies to oppose the extraterritorial reach of DoddFrank financial reforms. 35 For example, Michel Bernier, the E.U.’s Financial
Services Commissioner, has argued that it is not “acceptable that U.S. rules have
such a wide effect on other nations.” 36 Similarly, Richard Coffman, general
counsel for the Institute of International Bankers, complained that “the proposed
version [of the Volcker Rule] basically exports the . . . rule to our banks’ home
country operations . . . The only way they could avoid the rule’s reach is by debanking from the U.S.” 37 The criticism by foreign governments has diversified

30

Sally Miller, Why Non-US Regulators Are Not happy with the ‘Volcker Rule’, FIN. TIMES, Feb.
21, 2012, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/50d2c224-58b5-11e1-b9c6-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1pH
eQoE5H.
31
Id.
32
Mark Gongloff et al., Volcker Rule Hurts Wall Street, Bankers Warn, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb.
13, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/13/volcker-rule-wall-street_n_1274796.html.
33
Cameron, supra note 25.
34
Id.
35
See Onaran, supra note 29 (reporting that U.S. banks and their lobbyists have been in regular
contact with foreign governments regarding the proposed Volcker Rule and have warned these
governments of the rule’s potential impact on international markets).
36
Id.
37
Id.
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opposition to the extraterritorial scope of Dodd-Frank regulations and intensified
pressure on U.S. regulators to limit the reach of U.S. financial reforms as these
reforms are designed to protect U.S. interests abroad as well as at home. 38
Finally, foreign banks have suggested that U.S. clearing requirements
would reduce U.S. banks’ competitiveness in Europe. As Eila Kreivi, director of
capital markets at the EIB in Luxembourg, explained: “If you were faced with the
choice between trading with a counterparty with which you would be forced to
clear the trade, and one with which the trade would remain uncleared, the choice
of counterparty is an easy one, all other things remaining equal.”39 Thus, foreign
banks have allied themselves with Wall Street to argue that Dodd-Frank
regulations will hamper the competitiveness of the U.S. banking industry and,
subsequently, negatively impact U.S. economic growth.40 This argument
overlooks the essential fact that the purpose of Dodd-Frank derivatives regulation
was not to make U.S. banks more competitive with their foreign counterparts, but
to protect the U.S. taxpayer from bailing out domestic and foreign banks in order
to prevent the next worldwide financial Depression.
IV. THE EXTRATERRITORIAL SCOPE OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT
SATISFIES DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND ALIGNS WITH
ESTABLISHED REGULATORY PRACTICES
Despite the opposition to the application of Dodd-Frank reforms on an
extraterritorial basis, Section 722(d) aligns with U.S. constitutional principles and
established U.S. regulatory practice. Specifically, the extraterritorial reach of the
Dodd-Frank Act satisfies the Due Process requirements of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and accommodates U.S.
regulators’ demonstrated ability, when demonstrating personal jurisdiction, to sue
foreign entities in U.S. courts for harms caused to U.S. citizens and to the United
States.
A. U.S. Regulators Have Personal Jurisdiction Over Foreign Financial
Institutions That Trade With U.S. Persons and/or Harm the U.S. Economy
The Due Process Clause protects “against inconvenient litigation” and
limits the authority of U.S. state and federal courts “to render a valid personal
judgment against a nonresident defendant.”41 Despite the restrictions imposed by

38

Id. (reporting that “[t]he global reaction has been extraordinary” according to Karen Petron,
managing partner at Federal Financial Analytics).
39
Cameron, supra note 25.
40
See Dimon on Price Wars, Volcker Rule, Stock Prices (Fox Business broadcast Feb. 13, 2012),
available at http://video.foxbusiness.com/v/1450367194001/dimon-on-price-wars-volcker-rule-stoc
k-prices/ (claiming that Dodd-Frank regulations will drive swaps trades overseas).
41
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-92 (1980).
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Due Process, the Supreme Court has held that state and federal courts42 may
assert personal jurisdiction over non-residents. 43 In International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, the Court explained that “due process requires only that in order to
subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the
territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with” the forum. 44
Also, in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, the Court observed that “if
the sale of a product . . . arises from the efforts of . . . [a business to market] its
product in other States, it is not unreasonable to subject it to suit in one of those
States” if the product caused an injury in the state.45
In Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California, 46 the
Supreme Court relied on the minimal contacts test to hold that U.S. courts have
jurisdiction over foreign owned and operated corporations. Asahi was a Japanese
manufacturer that, prior to the lawsuit, had supplied valve assemblies to a
Taiwanese company that manufactured tubes for use in the wheels of Honda
vehicles. The plaintiff was injured when one of these tubes burst. 47 The
Supreme Court issued a fractured decision, effectively explaining two standards
for establishing personal jurisdiction. Justice O’Connor, writing the plurality
decision, concluded that “minimum contacts must come about by an action of the
defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State.” 48 Alternatively, Justice
Brennan concluded that “Asahi’s regular and extensive sales of component parts
to a manufacturer it knew was making regular sales of the final product in
California” satisfied the minimum contacts test established under the Due
Process Clause. 49The application of Dodd-Frank regulations to foreign
subsidiaries of U.S. bank holding companies, foreign persons who trade with
U.S. counterparties and/or to activities that have a “direct and significant
connection with . . . or effect on, commerce of the United States”50 finds their

42
See RICHARD L. MARCUS ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: A MODERN APPROACH 727 (4th ed. 2008)
(commenting that “jurisdictional problems are identical in state and federal Court”); see also FED.
R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A) (stating that “[s]erving a summons or filing a waiver of service establishes
personal jurisdiction over a defendant” in federal court if the defendant “is subject to the
jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located”);
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1878) (observing that “[t]he several States of the Union”
operate like nation-states in that they “possess and exercise the authority of independent States”).
43
See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 720, 723 (holding that “the authority of every tribunal is necessarily
restricted by the territorial limits of the State in which it is established,” but recognizing that “the
exercise of the jurisdiction which every State is admitted to possess over persons and property
within its own territory will often affect persons and property without it”); World-Wide
Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 293-94 (abandoning the principle that personal jurisdiction is confined by
territorial limits, while “stress[ing] that the Due Process Clause ensures . . . fairness . . . [and] the
‘orderly administration of the laws’”).
44
326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
45
444 U.S. at 297.
46
480 U.S. 102 (1987).
47
Id. at 105-06.
48
Id. at 112 (emphasis omitted)..
49
Id. at 121.
50
Dodd-Frank Act § 722(d)(i)(1).
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clearest acceptance under the O’Connor standard described above however, the
regulations are drafted such that they will satisfy any of the aforementioned
Supreme Court due process analyses. . The Supreme Court’s minimal contacts
test authorizes U.S. regulators to protect the interests of U.S. persons 51 by
regulating foreign institutions that “benefit economically” 52 from conducting
business with such persons. Similarly, the test authorizes U.S. regulators to sue
non-U.S. financial institutions whose swaps trading practices harm the financial
interests of the United States.
B. U.S. Regulators Have Successfully Sued Non-U.S. Companies for
Violating U.S. Financial Regulations
Enforcement actions by U.S. regulators against foreign financial
institutions conducting business wholly outside the United States comport with
the extraterritorial application of Dodd-Frank regulations to protect vested U.S.
interests. For example, on May 11, 1998 the CFTC issued an order accepting a
settlement fromSumitomo Corporation of Japan for manipulating the price of
copper in violation of Sections 6(c), 6(d), and 9(a)(2) of the Commodity
Exchange Act (CEA) through transactions that took place wholly outside of the
United States. 53 The CFTC found that a rogue trader at Sumitomo’s principal
place of business in Tokyo, Japan, maintained large and dominating futures
positions in copper metal on the London Metals Exchange (LME), and that these
wholly foreign transactions directly and substantially impacted copper prices and
markets in the United States. 54 The CFTC found that Sumitomo’s manipulation
of copper prices on the LME “caused prices on the [U.S.] Comex [and U.S. cash
market] to become similarly distorted and artificial.” 55 The order accepted
Sumitomo’s offer of settlement of $150 million for the CFTC’s findings to which
Sumitomo neither admitted nor denied, and ordered Sumitomo to cease and
desist from further violations of the CEA. 56 The CFTC’s success sanctioning
Sumitomo for violating U.S. commodities laws proves that the extraterritorial
reach of the Dodd-Frank Act merely codifies U.S. regulators’ existing authority

51

See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 723 (1878) (“Every State owes protection to its own citizens .
. . .”).
52
Asahi Metal Indus. Co., 480 U.S. at 121.
53
See Press Release, CFTC No. 4144-98, CFTC Files and Settles Action Against Sumitomo
Corporation For Manipulating the Copper Market in 1995-96, (May 11, 1998), available at
http://www.cftc.gov/opa/enf98/opa4144-98.htm.
54

See Sumitomo Corp., CFTC No. 98-14 (1998), available at http://www.cftc.gov/ogc/oporders98/
ogcfsumitomo.htm.
55
Id.
56
See Press Release, CFTC No. 4144-98, CFTC Files and Settles Action Against Sumitomo
Corporation For Manipulating the Copper Market in 1995-96, (May 11, 1998), available at
http://www.cftc.gov/opa/enf98/opa4144-98.htm.
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to instigate proceedings against non-U.S. companies whose actions directly harm
U.S. citizens and/or negatively impact the U.S. economy.
Further, far from complicating the extraterritorial application of DoddFrank swaps regulations, 57 the Supreme Court’s 2010 ruling in Morrison v.
National Australia Bank Ltd. 58 upholds Congress’s authority to implement U.S.
regulations across multiple jurisdictions in situations involving a U.S. citizen
and/or that threaten the U.S. economy. Morrison was a securities case that
involved a class action lawsuit in which foreign shareholders of National
Australia Bank sued the bank in U.S. District Court.59 The plaintiffs alleged that
the fraudulent actions of an American mortgage company (HomeSide Lending,
Inc.) owned by National Australia Bank violated Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act 60 and that this violation caused a dramatic drop in the bank’s share
price. 61 The Court’s decision hinged on a matter of statutory interpretation.
The Court in Morrison explained that a statute must “clearly express”
Congress’s “affirmative intention” to apply the statute extraterritorially. 62 It
denied the plaintiffs relief based on the fact that the language of the Securities
Exchange Act, as it existed prior to the passage of Dodd-Frank, did not establish
such an affirmative intent.63 The Court concluded that Section 10(b) applies only
to “purchases and sales of securities in the United States” or “transactions in
securities listed on domestic exchanges.” 64
Despite the outcome of Morrison, the Court maintained that Congress
may legislate on an extraterritorial basis. The Court emphasized that the
presumption against the extraterritorial application of statues is “a canon of
construction, or a presumption about a statute’s meaning, rather than a limit upon
Congress’s power to legislate.” 65 Congress exercised this power when, in
Section 929P of Dodd-Frank, it rebutted the presumption against
extraterritoriality in Morrison and authorized the SEC and Department of Justice
to apply U.S. securities laws across jurisdictions. 66 Congress also exercised its

57
See Smerek & Hamilton, supra note 21, at 4 (claiming that the Supreme Court’s decision in
Morrison renders the “impact of the Dodd-Frank Act regarding the extraterritorial application of
U.S. securities laws . . . far from certain”).
58
Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
59
Id. at 2875-76.
60
See 15 U.S.C. § 78j (b) (prohibiting the use of any manipulative or deceptive device “in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or
any security not so registered, or any securities-based swap agreement”); see also 17 C.F.R. §
240.10b-5 (prohibiting any act or omission that results in fraud or deceit upon any person, in
connection with the purchase or sale of a security).
61
Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2875-76.
62
Id. at 2877.
63
Id. at 2881 (“On its face, §10(b) contains nothing to suggest it applies abroad . . . .”).
64
Id. at 2884.
65
Id. at 2877.
66
See LUIS A. AGUILAR, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’R, STATEMENT BY COMMISSIONER: DEFRAUDED
INVESTORS DESERVE THEIR DAY IN COURT 2 (2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2
012/spch041112laa.htm (stating that Congress “fully restore[d] the ability of the Securities and
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legislative power when, in Section 722(d) of Dodd-Frank, it clearly and plainly
expressed its intent to apply Dodd-Frank regulations on an extraterritorial basis
to protect U.S. interests—Congress unequivocally authorized U.S. regulators to
initiate proceedings (assuming they have personal jurisdiction) against non-U.S.
entities that adversely affect U.S. citizens and/or directly and significantly impact
U.S. commerce. 67 Thus, the Morrison ruling in no way curtails the express
extraterritorial application of Dodd-Frank reforms.

Exchange Commission . . . and the Department of Justice . . . to bring enforcement actions under
Section 10(b) in cases involving transnational securities fraud pursuant to the pre-Morrison tests of
conduct and effect”).
67
Dodd-Frank Act § 722(d).
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V. THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF DODD-FRANK IS
NECESSARY TO PROTECT U.S. TAXPAYERS FROM HAVING TO
BAIL OUT WORLDWIDE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS THAT POSE A
SYSTEMIC RISK TO THE U.S. ECONOMY
The implementation of Dodd-Frank on an extraterritorial basis when
U.S. interests are directly involved or threatened would protect U.S. taxpayers
from the risks posed by the unregulated and interconnected global derivatives
market. The extraterritorial reach of Dodd-Frank promises to facilitate the
creation of uniform, global financial regulations that will reduce the risk of
regulatory arbitrage and protect U.S. taxpayers from having to bail out Too Big
to Fail Banks that engage in risky trading practices either within or outside of the
United States. Also, far from diminishing U.S. banks’ competitiveness in the
global marketplace, the extraterritorial scope of Dodd-Frank would improve the
competitive position of U.S. financial institutions by restoring investor
confidence in the U.S. derivatives market.
A. Dodd-Frank Regulations Must Be Applied On An Extraterritorial Basis
to Protect U.S. Taxpayers From the Demonstrated Risks to The U.S.
Economy Associated with the Global Derivatives Market
The extraterritorial scope of Title VII of Dodd-Frank accommodates the
interconnectedness of the global derivatives market and provides U.S. regulators
with the global reach they need to protect U.S. taxpayers from regulatory
arbitrage and ensuing market volatility. 68 As Jamie Dimon, chief executive
officer of JPMorgan Chase, recently commented, banks such as JPMorgan “move
trillions of dollars a day around the world, usually for global clients.”69 In this
regard—and in light of the multi-billion dollar losses that JPMorgan recently
incurred from synthetic derivatives trades made by its London subsidiary 70—
global derivatives trading entails considerable financial risk. 71 It involves

68
ROUNDTABLE TO DISCUSS INTERNATIONAL ISSUES, supra note 21, at 43 (testimony of Wally
Turbeville) (“Derivatives are ephemeral, they defy the notion of territoriality, they defy a lot of
things—they defy understanding.”); Financial Regulatory Reform: The International Context:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 1 (2011) [hereinafter Brainard
Testimony], available at http://financialservices.house.gov/UploadedFiles/061611brainard.pdf
(testimony of Lael Brainard, Under Secretary for International Affairs, Dep’t of Treasury)
(commenting that today’s financial markets are global and highly interconnected).
69
Dimon on Price Wars, Volcker Rule, Stock Prices, supra note 40.
70
Dawn Kopecki, Michael J. Moore & Christine Harper, JPMorgan Loses $2 Billion on Unit’s
‘Egregious Mistakes’, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, May 11, 2012,
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-11/jpmorgan-loses-2-billion-as-mistakes-trouncehedges.html.
71
ROUNDTABLE TO DISCUSS INTERNATIONAL ISSUES, supra note 21, at 68 (testimony of Robert
Cook) (arguing that “broad rules perhaps are best” because “activities in physical [commodities]
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multinational parent institutions that have integrated their financial resources
with the resources of their foreign subsidiaries so as to remain competitive in the
global derivatives market. Due to their significant cross-jurisdictional dealings,
these multinational institutions threaten the stability of the U.S. economy. 72
Specifically, subsidiaries and/or affiliates of U.S. parent companies that operate
outside of the United States and subsidiaries and/or affiliates of foreign parent
institutions that operate within the United States directly threaten U.S. economic
interests and, therefore, should be subject to Dodd-Frank reform. 73
Major financial entities manage their cash on a global basis so that no
clear operational separation exists between a U.S. parent and its foreign
subsidiaries. Lehman Brothers, for example, consisted of almost 3000 legal
entities that operated in fifty countries. At the time of Lehman’s insolvency, the
bank’s affiliates had over three hundred outstanding creditor and debtor balances
that totaled over $21 billion74 and several of the bank’s subsidiaries had difficulty
identifying their specific assets and liabilities. 75 In this respect, a foreign
subsidiary of a U.S. parent company constitutes an integral and indistinguishable
part of the parent institution and so should be classified as a U.S. person or U.S.
counterparty under Dodd-Frank as the plain language of that statute dictates.
The integrated accounting practices used by major U.S. financial
institutions and their foreign subsidiaries allows for a foreign subsidiary’s
unmargined trades (backed by no capital reserves set aside for the trades) to
undermine the stability of the U.S. parent. The American taxpayers’ $183 billion
bailout of American International Group (AIG) 76 proves that the financial
stability of even a major U.S. financial institution can be undercut by the
irresponsible trading practices of a foreign subsidiary. AIG’s British subsidiary,
AIG Financial Products, sold vast numbers of synthetic derivatives on mortgagebacked securities. When the value of these securities plummeted in the fall of
2008, AIG owed billions of dollars to investors who had bet against these
and not in our country have a huge effect back into [the U.S.] market”); see also Gary Gensler,
CFTC Chairman, Keynote Address on the Cross-Border Application of Dodd-Frank Swaps Market
Reforms Before the 2012 FINRA Annual Conference (May 21, 2012), U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES
TRADING COMMISSION [hereinafter Gensler Keynote Address],
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opagensler-113 (observing that swaps have
“concentrated and heightened risk in international financial institutions . . . [and] can contribute to
quickly spreading risk across borders”).
72
Gensler Keynote Address, supra note 70 (observing that “[l]arge, international financial
institutions are managed as an integrated web of legal entities” that share treasury, custodial,
brokerage and depository functions).
73
See also Gensler Keynote Address, supra note 70 (“When one affiliate of a large, international
financial group has problems, it’s accepted in the markets that this will infect the rest of the group.
If a financial run starts on one part of a group, almost regardless of where it is around the globe, it
invariably means a funding and liquidity crisis rapidly spreads to the entire consolidated entity.”)
74
Id.
75
Richard J. Herring, Wind-Down Plans as an Alternative to Bailouts: The Cross-Border
Challenges, in ENDING GOVERNMENT BAILOUTS AS WE KNOW THEM 125, 144-45 (Kenneth E. Scott
et al. eds., 2010).
76
Id. at 156.
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subprime mortgages being paid off. 77 As CFTC Chairman Gary Gensler has
observed, AIG’s “fast collapse . . . was sobering evidence of the markets’
international connectedness. Sobering evidence, as well, of how transactions
booked in London or anywhere around the globe can wreak havoc on the
American public.” 78 Foreign subsidiaries of U.S. parent institutions present a
serious threat to the U.S. economy and should be subject to Dodd-Frank
regulation even though these subsidiaries are located outside of the United States.
The failure of Barings Bank further proves that a foreign subsidiary’s
actions can easily bankrupt its parent institution. Barings had operated in the
United Kingdom for over 230 years before its demise. In 1995, the bank
collapsed after a rogue trader who operated out of the bank’s Singapore
subsidiary incurred losses of over $1 billion. 79
The multi-billion dollar trading losses recently incurred by JPMorgan
confirm that unregulated global swaps trading by the foreign subsidiaries of U.S.
banks presents a significant risk to U.S. taxpayers and the U.S. economy. As
previously mentioned, JPMorgan, the largest U.S. bank holding company, 80 is
assuming at least $2 billion in losses from bad trades in complex synthetic credit
derivatives that were made by a single trader—the “London Whale” 81—in the
bank’s U.K. subsidiary. JPMorgan’s multi-billion losses confirm that even
sophisticated U.S. banks cannot effectively manage the risks associated with
global swaps trading and that U.S. taxpayers are susceptible to bailing out U.S.
banks whose future trades, as was true of the subprime meltdown trades, surpass
the capital reserves of those U.S. bank holding companies or other large U.S.
financial institutions. 82 As Senator Tim Johnson, Chair of the Senate Committee
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, has stated, JPMorgan’s “massive
trading loss is a stark reminder of the financial crisis of 2008 and the necessity of

77

See Peter Koeing, AIG Trail Leads to London ‘Casino’, TELEGRAPH, Oct. 18, 2008, http://www.t
elegraph.co.uk/finance/financialcrisis/3225213/AIG-trail-leads-to-London-casino.html.
78
See Gary Gensler, CFTC Chairman, Testimony Before the US Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs (May 22, 2012), U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION,
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opagensler-114.
79
How Leeson Broke the Bank, BBC NEWS (June 22, 1999, 3:58 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/b
usiness/375259.stm.
80
See Jake Zamansky, Wall Street Compensation and JP Morgan: It's Déjà Vu All Over Again,
Forbes (June 1, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jakezamansky/2012/06/01/wall-streetcompensation-and-jp-morgan-its-deja-vu-all-over-again/.
81
JPMorgan May Lose $5 Billion On Derivatives, WSJ Reports, Bloomberg (May 18, 2012),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-18/jpmorgan-may-lose-5-billion-on-derivatives-wsjreports.html; see also Nelson Schwartz & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, JPMorgan’s Trading Loss Is
Said to Rise at Least 50%, N.Y.Times (May 16, 2012),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/05/16/jpmorgans-trading-loss-is-said-to-rise-at-least50/?smid=tw-nytimes&seid=auto.
82
Jennifer Liberto, CFTC investigating JPMorgan Chase, CNN Money (May 22, 2012),
http://money.cnn.com/2012/05/22/news/economy/jp-morgan-senate/index.htm (explaining that
U.S. banks like JPMorgan have direct access to the Federal Reserve's discount window and to
federal deposit insurance).
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Wall Street reform.” 83 This “massive” loss is also a reminder that Dodd-Frank—
which imposes strict capital, margin and transparency requirements on swaps
dealers 84—must apply on an extraterritorial basis when U.S. economic interests
are directly involved.
Despite the significant risks associated with swaps trading by globally
integrated financial institutions, legislators have attempted to weaken the
extraterritorial scope of Dodd-Frank. H.R. 3283 (“Swap Jurisdiction Certainty
Act”), which is presently stalled (as a result of the “London Whale” trading
fiasco) in the House Agricultural Committee, 85 would exempt swaps trades
between the foreign subsidiaries of U.S. banks and other U.S. companies from
the protections of Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act. 86 For example, the bill would
allow a foreign subsidiary of Goldman Sachs to conduct trillions of dollars of
overseas swaps trades with the foreign subsidiaries of JPMorgan and/or General
Motors without having to satisfy Dodd-Frank’s capital, margin or transparency
requirements. 87
If it becomes law (and prior to the “London Whale” fiasco, it was sailing
through the U.S. House on a bi-partisan basis), H.R. 3283 would create a major
loophole in Dodd-Frank 88 by encouraging banks to migrate their swaps business
overseas. Large U.S. banks and corporations operate numerous foreign
subsidiaries throughout the world; consequently, they could easily route their
swaps trades through their foreign subsidiaries in order to avoid U.S. financial
regulation. Such a large-scale migration would cause the vast majority of swaps
trades not to be cleared, exchange-traded or otherwise publicly reported, and,
subsequently, would significantly reduce transparency and stability in the global
derivatives market. Such a migration would also send financial jobs overseas,
while continuing to expose U.S. tax payers, consumers, and businesses to the

83
Tim Johnson, Chair of Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Johnson
Statement on Derivatives Reform Hearing, (May 22, 2012),
http://banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Newsroom.PressReleases&ContentRecord
_id=75aea17c-d90e-40e0-4809-0791b8d6bb74.
84
See Barbara Roper, Will JPMorgan's Loss Provide a Win for Wall Street Reform?, HUFFINGTON
POST BUSINESS (May 14, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/barbara-roper/jpmorgan-wallstreet-reform_b_1516352.html#es_share_ended; see also Steven Pearlstein, JPMorgan’s Soap
Opera Makes Clear That Wall Street Is Detached From Reality (May 19, 2012),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/2011/02/24/ABPqBzI_page.html.
85
Silla Brush, Dodd-Frank Swaps Legislation Delayed After JPMorgan Trade Losses, BLOOMBERG
(May 5, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-15/dodd-frank-swaps-legislationdelayed-after-jpmorgan-trade-losses.html.
86
Swap Jurisdiction Certainty Act of 2012, H.R. 3283, 112th Cong. (2011-12) (defining an
“agency or branch of a U.S. person located outside the United States” as a “non-U.S. person” and
exempting transactions between non-U.S. persons and domestic swap dealers and/or their foreign
affiliates from Dodd-Frank protections).
87
See Michael Hirsh, Why Wall Street Hasn’t Changed—Part II, INFORMING THE 99 PERCENT (Mar.
30, 2012), http://informingthe99percent.blogspot.com/2012/03/why-wall-street-hasnt-changed-partii.html.
88
See Mark Gongloff, Dodd-Frank Act Under Assault Again, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 27, 2012),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mark-gongloff/dodd-frank-act-under-assault_b_1383703.html.
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demonstrated risks associated with foreign swaps transactions—risks that
Congress sought to eliminate when it passed Dodd-Frank.
The subsidiaries of foreign banks that operate in the United States also
threaten the stability of the U.S. economy and Dodd-Frank correctly brings them
under U.S. jurisdiction. U.S. taxpayers should not subsidize foreign banks that
own subsidiaries in the United States for trades that place the U.S. economy
(indeed the world economy) at risk. 89 For example, Norinchukin Bank, the same
Tokyo-based bank that opposed the extraterritorial reach of the proposed Volcker
Rule, 90 borrowed almost $22 billion of emergency funds from the Federal
Reserve during the 2008 financial crisis.91 As Professor Anat Admati of Stanford
University has observed, the U.S. government should not provide a safety net for
foreign banks to engage in risky derivatives trading. 92 Classifying the U.S.
subsidiaries of foreign lending institutions as U.S. persons and subjecting these
subsidiaries to Dodd-Frank regulation would protect the U.S. economy from
systemic risk. Regulating U.S. subsidiaries of foreign institutions would also
protect U.S. taxpayers from having to spend billions of dollars to save large and
small banks all over the world, like U.S. taxpayers did—by way of, inter alia, the
Federal Reserve’s discount window—immediately after the 2008 financial
crisis. 93
Subjecting foreign subsidiaries of U.S. parents and U.S. subsidiaries of
foreign banks to Dodd-Frank’s requirements would help prevent U.S. taxpayers
from subsidizing the poor choices of foreign jurisdictions that adopt permissive
financial regulations. Foreign governments and taxpayers may choose to enact
financial regulations that allow for undercapitalized and non-transparent trading
in their jurisdiction; they may also choose to bail out banks that engage in this
kind of risky trading. However, U.S. taxpayers must not be forced to bail out
foreign institutions that engage in risky derivatives trades in jurisdictions that
adopt lenient financial regulations when these trades risk wreaking havoc on the
U.S. economy.

89
Onaran, supra note 29 (reporting that foreign banks from as far away as Singapore may receive
support from the Federal Reserve during a financial crisis if they have even a minimal presence in
the United States).
90
See Gongloff et al., supra note 32, and accompanying text.
91
Onaran, supra note 29.
92
Id.
93
Keoun & Torres, supra note 3 (reporting that in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis many
foreign banks borrowed from the Federal Reserve’s discount window: Dexia, a Belgian- and
French-based bank, borrowed approximately $33.5 billion; Depfa Bank, based in Dublin and now
owned by the German government, borrowed $24.5 billion; and the Bank of Scotland borrowed at
least $11 billion).
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B. The Extraterritorial Scope of Dodd-Frank Promises to Facilitate
Standard Global Financial Regulation that Will Protect U.S. Citizens from
Systemic Risk
Comprehensive and harmonious international financial regulation is best,
and perhaps only, achieved by the timely implementation of Dodd-Frank. The
extraterritorial scope of U.S. standards or their equivalent would facilitate robust
global financial regulations that promise to protect the world’s taxpayers from
regulatory arbitrage while helping to ensure a level playing field for all of the
world’s financial institutions.
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1. Implementing Dodd-Frank On An Extraterritorial Basis Will Provide the
World’s Taxpayers with Timely Protection from Regulatory Arbitrage
International coordination and cooperation during the rule-making
process—as mandated by Section 719(c) of the Dodd-Frank Act 94—has
undoubtedly strengthened a uniform global financial regulatory template.
However, limiting the extraterritorial scope of Dodd-Frank reforms risks
complicating and even undercutting ongoing efforts to standardize derivatives
Specifically, the jurisdiction-byregulation on an international basis. 95
jurisdiction financial reform advocated by Wall Street, the City of London,
foreign banks and governments, and their allies would produce multiple, rather
than uniform, regulatory regimes throughout the world. In turn, these regimes
would prove difficult, if not impossible, to cohere into a comprehensive, global
financial regulatory regime that can restore stability to the world’s $700 trillion
derivatives market.
Even assuming that international regulators could achieve consensus on
common, international financial regulations, in the absence of appropriate
extraterritorial reach of Dodd-Frank, harmonizing U.S. and foreign regulations
would expose American taxpayers, businesses, and consumers to significant
economic risk for years – if not decades. Although many jurisdictions are using
the Dodd-Frank statutory framework for a regulatory template, 96 non-U.S.
jurisdictions have not gotten heavily into the arduous process of translating
statutory principles into operational regulations. For example, the United

94

Dodd-Frank Act § 719(c)(1)(A)-(B) (requiring the CFTC and SEC to study swap and
clearinghouse regulations in European and Asian jurisdictions and to identify areas where these
regulations might align with U.S. rules for financial markets).
95
Letter from Timothy Geithner, Sec’y of the Treasury, to Congressman Spencer Bachus (Sept. 14,
2011) [hereinafter Geithner Letter] (explaining that the SEC and CFTC have studied the
international implications of Dodd-Frank regulations and are working with their European and
Asian counterparts to produce comparable financial regulations) (on file with author).
96
Geithner Letter, supra note 79, at 1 (commenting that Dodd-Frank is “set[ting] the global
standard for oversight and transparency in the derivates market”); see also Brainard Testimony,
supra note 67, at 1; COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N STAFF, DERIVATIVES REFORM:
COMPARISON OF TITLE VII OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT TO INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION (2010),
available at http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/speechandtestimony/g
mac_100510-cftc2.pdf (noting that the European Commission’s laws governing over-the-counter
derivatives align with principles established by Dodd-Frank and that Europe is preparing to
implement Dodd-Frank’s two-tiered registration scheme); FIN. SERVS. AGENCY, GOV’T OF JAPAN,
NEW REGULATION OF OTC DERIVATIVES IN JAPAN (2010), available at http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/gro
ups/public/@aboutcftc/documents/file/gmac_100510_fsag.pdf (stating that in May of last year
Japan amended its Financial Instruments and Exchange Act to adopt similar reporting and clearing
requirements to the United States); George Mathew, Optimistic About Parliament Passing FCRA
Amendment Bill in Next Session, INDIAN EXPRESS, June 27, 2011, http://www.indianexpress.com/ne
ws/optimistic-about-parliament-passing-fcra-amendment-bill-in-next-session/809040/2 (reporting
that the Indian parliament was debating legislation that, like Dodd-Frank, would restore
transparency to OTC markets).
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Kingdom has indicated that it may not implement the general reforms recently
stipulated by the Independent Commission on Banking until 2019 when the new
rules established by the Basel III international agreement on capital held by
banks must come into effect.97 The European Union is in a similar position: it
has enacted financial reform legislation, but has only recently begun the rulemaking process. 98 In this respect, denying Congress’s express directive to apply
Dodd-Frank extraterritorially to transactions involving U.S. parties or the
stability of the U.S. economy invites the kind of discombobulated, global
financial regulation that would expose U.S. taxpayers to the risks associated with
derivatives trading for the foreseeable future.
Additionally, international regulatory organizations have proposed global
standards for financial reform. For example, the International Organization of
Securities Commissions (IOSCO) recently released a report entitled
“International Standards For Derivatives Market Intermediary Regulation”99 in
which it observes that “[c]ross-border consistency among market authorities . . .
is essential to successful oversight of the global OTC derivatives market.” 100 The
report offers fifteen recommendations regarding intermediaries in the swaps
market that are similar to U.S. regulations. For example, the report recommends
that market intermediaries register with market regulators and that intermediaries
be subject to margin and capital requirements. 101
IOSCO’s report represents an important step toward harmonizing global
financial regulation; however, the report’s recommendations are vague—they
offer general principles without providing the details necessary for the successful

97

Robert Peston, Banks Face Biggest Shake-Up for Decades, BBC NEWS (Sept. 12, 2011), http://w
ww.bbc.co.uk/news/business-14877861; see also Mark Hoban, Fin. Sec’y to the Treasury, Britain
Still Leads Critical Financial Reform Talks, TELEGRAPH, Feb. 19, 2012, http://www.telegraph.co.u
k/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/9091829/Britain-still-leads-critical-financial-reform-talks.
html (“While we support what has been agreed to date, there remains much work to do.”).
98
See ATLANTIC COUNCIL & THOMSON REUTERS, THE DANGER OF DIVERGENCE: TRANSATLANTIC
COOPERATION ON FINANCIAL REFORM I (2010), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Fil
es/rc/reports/2010/1007_atlantic_council_elliott/1007_atlantic_council_elliott.pdf
(commenting
that while Europe is still considering major financial-reform legislation, the U.S. “has already set a
framework to address the root causes” of the 2008 financial crisis); Laws For All: Lots of Rules,
But Not All Good Ones, ECONOMIST, Feb. 18, 2012, http://www.economist.com/node/21547835
(reporting that the European Commission has issued over twenty proposed rules that are at different
stages in the legislative process—forthcoming, under negotiation, and adopted—but that overall
E.U. regulations are fragmented and trail U.S. efforts to regulate derivatives trading under DoddFrank); John O’Donnell, EU Considers New Controls for Shadow Banking, REUTERS, Mar. 19,
2012, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/19/us-eu-shadowbanking-idUSBRE82I0
KM20120319 (reporting that the E.U. has been criticized for being “slow to tackle the causes of a
financial crisis that struck Europe roughly five years ago”).
99
International Organization of Securities Commissions, International Standards For Derivatives
Market Intermediary Regulation (June 2012),
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD381.pdf.
100
Id. at 1.
101
Id. at 9 and 16-17; see also id. at 1 (stating that the report’s recommendations pertain to
substantive areas such as business conduct, capital, registration, and recordkeeping standards).
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implementation of global financial reforms—and its survey of different
jurisdictional approaches to market reform confirms that the U.S. remains well
ahead of other jurisdictions with respect to derivatives reform. For example,
IOSCO recommends that market intermediaries “should be subject to business
conduct standards designed to ensure they operate in an ethical manner . . . [and]
be strictly prohibited from engaging in any illegal or abusive practices.”102 In
contrast, the CFTC has adopted specific prohibitions against fraud, manipulation,
and other market abuses, and requires swaps parties to communicate in good
faith. 103 Also, IOSCO reports that while “[s]ome jurisdictions are in the process
of developing recordkeeping requirements” for market intermediaries, the CFTC
is the only market authority that already has adopted rules that will require
market intermediaries to submit specific documentation to a trade repository. 104
Finally, IOSCO identifies the CFTC’s “robust standards for business
supervision” 105—the monitoring of trades, risk management procedures, conflict
of interest controls, qualifications for supervisors—as a model for the majority of
jurisdictions that have yet to develop business supervisory obligations of any
kind. 106
In contrast to European and other international financial reform efforts,
U.S. regulators are on the brink of completing the complex DoddFrank “implementation” stage and are on a glide path to regulate derivatives by
as early as the end of 2012. 107 Although the CFTC failed to finalize its rules by
the July 16, 2011, deadline set by Congress 108 and has continued to push back

102

Id. at 22.
Id. at 20. See also 17 C.F.R. § 23.410 (2012), http://ecfr.gpoaccess.gov/cgi/t/text/textidx?c=ecfr&sid=6fac120fe676c8b493ebdf77a4bfb07e&rgn=div8&view=text&node=17:1.0.1.1.22.
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internal deadlines,109 CFTC Chairman Gary Gensler has repeatedly stated that his
agency will likely finalize almost all of its financial regulations by late 2012. 110
Further, the strict and geographically limited jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction
approach to financial regulation supported by Wall Street and its allies ignores
the fact that the immense size of U.S. financial markets means that the
appropriate extraterritorial reach of Dodd-Frank regulations will serve as a de
facto global standard for derivatives regulation. In this sense, the extraterritorial
application of Dodd-Frank reforms is an almost inevitable result of U.S. attempts
to ensure that derivatives trading is properly capitalized, collateralized and
transparent. The United States government oversees approximately half of the
world’s now $700 trillion global derivatives market 111 and most major foreign
banks and financial entities participate in U.S.-regulated markets. 112 The
dominant position of the U.S. derivatives market means that most global
financial entities conduct swap transactions either in the United States113 or with
U.S. counterparties 114 and so will be subject to Dodd-Frank regulation. Also, the
high-volume trades regularly conducted by global financial entities are likely to
have “a direct and significant connection” with U.S. markets, even if the trades
are transacted outside of the United States. Consequently, major foreign banks,
despite their threats not to trade with U.S. counterparties, will register as SDs
with the CFTC and develop internal practices that comply with U.S. trading
requirements—these banks cannot afford to be sued in U.S. courts for violating
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U.S. regulations or in any way risk not having access to the world’s most
lucrative market. 115
2. Broad-Based U.S. Financial Regulation Will Preserve the Competitive
Position of U.S. Financial Institutions in the Global Derivatives Market
The extraterritorial application of Dodd-Frank financial reforms will
facilitate, not stymie, the competitiveness of U.S. banks and financial institutions.
Implementing Dodd-Frank financial regulations on an extraterritorial basis when
U.S. interests are directly at stake would standardize financial regulations for
U.S. and large foreign financial institutions so that U.S. institutions would not be
at a competitive disadvantage in the global marketplace. In this respect, the
extraterritorial scope of Dodd-Frank would simultaneously prevent regulatory
arbitrage and level the playing field between competing financial institutions
located in different jurisdictions.
U.S. and European banks have often claimed that new financial rules will
diminish their competitiveness in an attempt to avoid being subject to further
regulation. U.S. banks argue that regulation under Dodd-Frank prevents them
from competing with European banks; European banks argue that European
financial regulations favor U.S. banks. 116 For example, U.S. and British banks
oppose proposed margin and capital requirements in their respective jurisdictions
for the same reason: the requirements (supposedly) impede international
competitiveness. 117 At the same time, JP Morgan’s Jamie Dimon has commented
that the Basel III agreement is “un-American” and that it will compromise
American banks’ dominance in the global financial industry. 118
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The ongoing fight between London-based Barclays Bank and the British
government over financial reform in Britain epitomizes the banking industry’s
strategy of equating new regulation with loss of profits. Barclays has repeatedly
threatened to relocate to the United States if the British government requires
British banks to separate their high street retail operations from their investment
banking work. 119 As Congressman Barney Frank has observed, the threats made
by U.S. banks to migrate to the United Kingdom and the simultaneous threats by
U.K. banks to migrate to the United States are reminiscent of “the 13-year-old
son of divorced parents who tries to play Mommy off against Daddy.” 120 The
threats made by banks are both empty and divisive. They are intended to weaken
financial regulation on both sides of the Atlantic. Again, the extraterritorial
scope of Dodd-Frank has already served as a worldwide template for regulation.
However, the U.S. has jump started this process. will help establish robust and
uniform global financial reforms that will prevent major international banks from
evading regulation by relocating their operations offshore.
VI. CONCLUSION
A failure to apply Dodd-Frank-mandated regulations to the trillions of
dollars of swaps trading activities that take place outside the United States (but
that directly and potentially adversely affect the U.S. economy) would expose the
American public to the multifaceted and considerable risks associated with the
interconnected, global derivatives market. Specifically, the limited application of
Dodd-Frank regulations to the geographical U.S. would complicate the creation
of the kind of robust international standards that would reduce the threat of
regulatory arbitrage and, ultimately, a repeat of the 2008 financial crisis. In
contrast, applying Dodd-Frank regulations on an extraterritorial basis where the
U.S. has the appropriate contacts would facilitate the kind of robust, international
financial reforms that are necessary to regulate today’s integrated global market
and, by extension, protect U.S. taxpayers from systemic financial risk while
ensuring the competitiveness of U.S. financial institutions.
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